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Abstract
We show how static analysis for secure information flow can be ex-
pressed and proved correct entirely within the framework of abstract
interpretation. The key idea is to define a Galois connection that
directly approximates the hyperproperty of interest. To enable use
of such Galois connections, we introduce a fixpoint characterisation
of hypercollecting semantics, i.e. a “set of sets” transformer. This
makes it possible to systematically derive static analyses for hyper-
properties entirely within the calculational framework of abstract
interpretation. We evaluate this technique by deriving example static
analyses. For qualitative information flow, we derive a dependence
analysis similar to the logic of Amtoft and Banerjee (SAS’04) and
the type system of Hunt and Sands (POPL’06). For quantitative infor-
mation flow, we derive a novel cardinality analysis that bounds the
leakage conveyed by a program instead of simply deciding whether
it exists. This encompasses problems that are hypersafety but not
k-safety. We put the framework to use and introduce variations
that achieve precision rivalling the most recent and precise static
analyses for information flow.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.2.4 [Software Engineer-
ing]: Software/Program Verification–Assertion checkers; D.3 [Pro-
gramming Languages]; F.3.1 [Logics and meanings of programs]:
Semantics of Programming Language
Keywords static analysis, abstract interpretation, information flow
1. Introduction
Most static analyses tell something about all executions of a program.
This is needed, for example, to validate compiler optimizations.
Functional correctness is also formulated in terms of a predicate
on observable behaviours, i.e. more or less abstract execution
traces: A program is correct if all its traces satisfy the predicate.
By contrast with such trace properties, extensional definitions
of dependency involve more than one trace. To express that the
final value of a variable x may depend only on the initial value
of a variable y, the requirement—known as noninterference in
the security literature (?)—is that any two traces with the same
initial value for y result in the same final value for x. Sophisticated
information flow policies allow dependency subject to quantitative
bounds—and their formalisations involve more than two traces,
sometimes unboundedly many.
For secure information flow formulated as decision problems,
the theory of hyperproperties classifies the simplest form of non-
interference as 2-safety and some quantitative flow properties as
hypersafety properties (?). A number of approaches have been ex-
plored for analysis of dependency, including type systems, program
logics, and dependency graphs. Several works have used abstract
interpretation in some way. One approach to 2-safety is by form-
ing a product program that encodes execution pairs (???), thereby
reducing the problem to ordinary safety which can be checked by
abstract interpretation (?) or other means. Alternatively, a 2-safety
property can be checked by dedicated analyses which may rely in
part on ordinary abstract interpretations for trace properties (?).
The theory of abstract interpretation serves to specify and
guide the design of static analyses. It is well known that effective
application of the theory requires choosing an appropriate notion
of observable behaviour for the property of interest (???). Once
a notion of “trace” is chosen, one has a program semantics and
“all executions” can be formalized in terms of collecting semantics,
which can be used to define a trace property of interest, and thus to
specify an abstract interpretation (???).
The foundation of abstract interpretation is quite general, based
on Galois connections between semantic domains on which collec-
ting semantics is defined. ? formalize the notion of hyperproperty
in a very general way, as a set of sets of traces. Remarkably, prior
works using abstract interpretation for secure information flow do
not directly address the set-of-sets dimension and instead involve
various ad hoc formulations. This paper presents a new approach
of deriving information flow static analyses within the calculational
framework of abstract interpretation.
First contribution. We lift collecting semantics to sets of trace
sets, dubbed hypercollecting semantics, in a fixpoint formulation
which is not simply the lifted direct image. This can be composed
with Galois connections that specify hyperproperties beyond 2-
safety, without recourse to ad hoc additional notions. On the basis
of this foundational advance, it becomes possible to derive static
analyses entirely within the calculational framework of abstract
interpretation (???).
Second contribution. We use hypercollecting semantics to
derive an analysis for ordinary dependency. This can be seen as a
rational reconstruction of both the type system of ?? and the logic of
?. They determine, for each variable x, a conservative approximation
of the variables y whose initial values influence the final value of x.
Third contribution. We derive a novel analysis for quantitative
information flow. This shows the benefit of taking hyperproperties
seriously by means of abstract interpretation. For noninterference,
once the variables y on which x depends have fixed values, there
can be only one final value for x. For quantitative information flow,
one is interested in measuring the extent to which other variables
influence x: for a given range of variation for the “high inputs”,
what is the range of variation for the final values of x? We directly
address this question as a hyperproperty: given a set of traces that
agree only on the low inputs, what is the cardinality of the possible
final values for x? Using the hypercollecting semantics, we derive
a novel cardinality abstraction. We show how it can be used for
analysis of quantitative information problems including a bounding
problem which is not k-safety for any k.
The calculational approach disentangles key design decisions
and it enabled us to identify opportunities for improving precision.
We assess the precision of our analyses and provide a formal
characterisation of precision for a quantitative information flow
analysis vis a vis qualitative. Versions of our analyses rival state of
the art analyses for qualitative and quantitative information flow.
Our technical development uses the simplest programming
language and semantic model in which the ideas can be exposed.
One benefit of working entirely within the framework of abstract
interpretation is that a wide range of semantics and analyses are
already available for rich programming languages.
Outline. Following the background (??), we introduce domains
and Galois connections for hyperproperties (??) and hypercollecting
semantics (??). Hyperproperties for information flow are defined in
??. We use the framework to derive the static analyses in ?? and ??.
?? uses examples to evaluate the precision of the analyses, and shows
how existing analyses can be leveraged to improve precision. We
discuss related work (??) and conclude. An accompanying technical
report (?) contains detailed proofs for all results, as well as a table
of symbols.
2. Background: Collecting Semantics, Galois
Connections
The formal development uses deterministic imperative programs
over integer variables. Let n range over literal integers Z, x over vari-
ables, and ⊕ (resp. cmp) over some arithmetic (resp. comparison)
operators.
c ::= skip | x := e | c1; c2 | if b then c1 else c2 | while b do c
e ::= n | x | e1 ⊕ e2 | b
b ::= e1 cmp e2
Different program analyses may consider different semantic do-
mains as needed to express a given class of program properties.
For imperative programs, the usual domains are based on states
σ ∈ States that map each variable to a value (?). Some program
properties require the use of traces that include intermediate states;
others can use more abstract domains. For information flow prop-
erties involving intermediate outputs, or restricted to explicit data
flow (?), details about intermediate steps are needed. By contrast,
bounding the range of variables can be expressed in terms of final
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Figure 1. Fragment of the hierarchy of semantic domains
( abstraction−−−−−→)
states. As another example, consider determining which variables
are left unchanged: To express this, we need both initial and final
states.
In this paper we use the succinct term trace for elements of
Trc defined by Trc , States× States, interpreting t ∈ Trc as an
initial and final state. In the literature, these are known as relational
traces, by contrast with maximal trace semantics using the set
States∗ of finite sequences. A uniform framework describes the
relationships and correspondences between these and many other
semantic domains using Galois connections (?). Three of these
domains are depicted in ??.
Given partially ordered sets C,A, the monotone functions
α ∈ C → A and γ ∈ A → C comprise a Galois connection,
a proposition we write (C,≤) −−→←−−α
γ
(A,v), provided they satisfy
α(c) v a iff c ≤ γ(a) for all c ∈ C, a ∈ A.
For example, to specify an analysis that determines which
variables are never changed, let A be sets of variables. Define
α ∈ P(Trc) → P(Vars) by α(T ) = {x | ∀(σ, σ′) ∈ T, σ(x) =
σ′(x)} and γ(X) = {(σ, σ′) | ∀x ∈ X, σ(x) = σ′(x)}. Then
(P(Trc),⊆) −−→←−−α
γ
(P(V ar),⊇).
For the hierarchy of usual domains, depicted in ??, the con-
nections are defined by an “element-wise abstraction”. Define
elt ∈ States∗ → Trc by elt(σ0σ1 . . . σn) , (σ0, σn). This lifts to
an abstraction P(States∗)→ P(Trc).
Lemma 1 Element-wise abstraction. Let elt ∈ C → A be a
function between sets. Let αelt(C) , {elt(c) | c ∈ C} and
γelt(A) , {c | elt(c) ∈ A}. Then (P(C),⊆) −−−−→←−−−−αelt
γelt
(P(A),⊆).
The domain P(States), which suffices to describe the final
reachable states of a program, is an abstraction of the relational
domain P(Trc), by elt(σ, τ) , τ . In this paper we focus on the
domain Trc because it is the simplest that can express dependency.
Program semantics. We define both the denotational semantics
JcK ∈ Trc⊥ → Trc⊥ of commands and the denotational semantics
JeK ∈ Trc → Val of expressions. Here Val , Z and Trc⊥ adds
bottom element ⊥ using the flat ordering.
Standard semantics of commands JcK ∈ Trc⊥ → Trc⊥
JcK⊥ , ⊥ Jx := eK(σ, τ) , (σ, τ [x 7→ JeK(σ, τ)])
Jc1; c2Kt , Jc2K ◦ Jc1Kt JskipKt , t
Jif b then c1 else c2Kt ,
{
Jc1Kt if JbKt = 1
Jc2Kt if JbKt = 0
Jwhile b do cKt , (lfp4̇(λt.⊥) F)(t)
where F(w)(t) ,
{
t if JbKt = 0
w ◦ JcKt otherwise
Let t be a trace (σ, τ). The denotation JeKt evaluates e in the
“current state”, τ . (In ?? we also use JeKpret which evaluates e in the
initial state, σ.) The denotation JcKt is (σ, τ ′) where execution of c in
τ leads to τ ′. The denotation is⊥ in case c diverges from τ . Boolean
expressions evaluate to either 0 or 1. We assume programs do not
go wrong. We denote by 4̇ the point-wise lifting to Trc⊥ → Trc⊥
of the approximation order 4 on Trc⊥.
The terminating computations of c can be written as its image
on the initial traces: {JcKt | t ∈ IniTrc and JcKt 6= ⊥} where
IniTrc , {(σ, σ) | σ ∈ States}
To specify properties that hold for all executions we use collec-
ting semantics which lifts the denotational semantics to arbitrary
sets T ∈ P(Trc) of traces. The idea is that {|c|}T is the direct image
of JcK on T . To be precise, in this paper we focus on termination-
insensitive properties, and thus {|c|}T is the set of non-⊥ traces t′
such that JcKt = t′ for some t ∈ T . Later we also use the collecting
semantics of expressions: {|e|}T , {JeKt | t ∈ T}.
Importantly, the collecting semantics {|c|} ∈ P(Trc)→ P(Trc)
can be defined compositionally using fixpoints (?, Sec. 7). For condi-
tional guard b, write {| grdb |} for the filter defined by {| grdb |}T ,
{t ∈ T | JbKt = 1}.
Collecting semantics {|c|} ∈ P(Trc)→ P(Trc)
{|x := e|}T , {Jx := eKt | t ∈ T}
{|c1; c2|}T , {|c2|} ◦ {|c1|}T {|skip|}T , T
{|if b then c1 else c2|}T , {|c1|} ◦ {| grdb |}T ∪{|c2|} ◦ {| grd¬b |}T
{|while b do c|}T , {| grd¬b |}
(
lfp⊆T {|if b then c else skip|}
)
The clause for while loops uses the denotation of a constructed
conditional command as a definitional shorthand—its denotation is
compositional.
Given a Galois connection (P(Trc),⊆) −−→←−−α
γ
(A,v), such as
the one for unmodified variables, the desired analysis is specified as
α ◦ {|c|} ◦ γ. Since it is not computable in general, we only require
an approximation f ] ∈ A→ A that is sound in this sense:
α ◦ {|c|} ◦ γ v̇ f ] (1)
where v̇ denotes the point-wise lifting of the partial order v.
To explain the significance of this specification, suppose one
wishes to prove program c satisfies a trace property T ∈ P(Trc),
i.e. to prove that {|c|}(IniTrc) ⊆ T . Given ?? it suffices to find an
abstract value a that approximates IniTrc, i.e. IniTrc ⊆ γ(a), and
show that
γ(f ](a)) ⊆ T (2)
?? is equivalent to {|c|} ◦ γ ⊆̇ γ ◦ f ] by a property of Galois
connections. So ?? implies {|c|}(γ(a)) ⊆ T which (by monotonicity
of {|c|}) implies {|c|}(IniTrc) ⊆ {|c|}(γ(a)) ⊆ T .
The beauty of specification ?? is that f ] can be obtained as
an abstract interpretation {|c|}], derived systematically for all c by
calculating from the left side of ?? as shown by ?.
3. Domains and Galois Connections for
Hyperproperties
To express hyperproperties, we need Galois connections for domains
that involve sets of sets of observable behaviours. This section spells
out how such powerset domains form a hierarchy as illustrated
along the top of ??. We describe how dependency and quantitative
information flow can be formulated as Galois connections. We spell
out a methodology whereby the standard notions and techniques of
abstract interpretation can be applied to specify and derive—in the
same form as ??—static analyses for hyperproperties.
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Figure 2. Extended hierarchy of semantic domains ( abstraction−−−−−→)
As a first example, consider the condition: the final value of x
depends only on the initial value of y. Its expression needs, at least,
two traces: If two traces, denoted by (σ, σ′) and (τ, τ ′), agree on
the initial value of y then they agree on the final value of x. That is,
σ(y) = τ(y) implies σ′(x) = τ ′(x). This must hold for any two
traces of the program. This is equivalent to the following: For all
sets T of traces, if traces in T all agree on the initial value of y then
they all agree on the final value of x. Later we extend this example
to an analysis that infers which dependences hold.
Consider the problem of quantifying dependence with min-
capacity (?). For a program on two integer variables h, l, the
problem is to infer how much information is conveyed via l about
h: considering some traces that agree on the initial value of l, how
many final values are possible for l. For example, the program
l := (h mod 2) + l has two final values for l, for each initial l,
though there are many possible initial values for h. This cardinality
problem generalizes prior work on quantitative flow analysis, where
typically low inputs are not considered.
Whereas the simple dependency problem can be formulated in
terms of 2-element sets, the cardinality problem involves sets of
unbounded size. In the terminology of hyperproperties, it is not a
k-safety hyperproperty for any k (?, Sec. 3), although it is hyper-
safety (?). For a fixed k, the problem “variable l has at most k − 1
final values” is k-safety, which means it can be formulated in terms
of sets with at most k traces.
It turns out that by using Galois connections on sets of sets, we
can develop a general theory that encompasses many hyperproperties
and which enables derivation of interesting abstract interpreters. For
our applications, we use relational traces as the notion of observable
behavior, and thusP(P(Trc)). The approach works as well for other
notions, so there is a hierarchy of domains as shown at the top of
??, in parallel with the ordinary hierarchy shown along the bottom.
The abstractions of this hierarchy are obtained by lifting each
abstraction between two standard collecting semantics (?) to their
hypercollecting versions, by element-wise abstraction (??). For
instance, ?? justifies the abstraction between P(P(Trc)) and
P(P(States)), by lifting the abstraction between P(Trc) and
P(States) (?, Sec. 8). Additionally, the diagonal lines in ?? repre-
sent abstractions between hypercollecting semantics defined over
some form of observations and the corresponding collecting seman-
tics defined over the same observations.
Lemma 2 . Let C be a set. Define αhpp(C) , ∪C∈C C and
γhpp(C) , P(C). These form a Galois connection:
(P(P(C)),⊆) −−−−−→←−−−−−αhpp
γhpp
(P(C),⊆)
It is noted by ? that any trace property can be lifted to a unique
hyperproperty; this lifting is exactly the concretisation γhpp of ??.
Although the model of ? is quite general, it does focus on infinite
traces. But hyperproperties can be formulated in terms of other
notions of observation, as illustrated in ??.
Cardinality abstraction. To lay the groundwork for our quanti-
tative information flow analysis, we consider abstracting a set of
values by its cardinality. Cardinality is one ingredient in many quan-
titative information flow analyses estimating the amount of sensitive
information a program may leak (??????). The lattice of abstract
representations we consider is the set
[0,∞] , N ∪ {∞}
where ∞ denotes an infinite cardinal number. We use the natu-
ral order ≤, and max as a join. Consider the abstraction ope-
rator crdval ∈ P(Val) → [0,∞] computing cardinality and
given by crdval(V ) , |V |. This operator crdval is not addi-
tive, i.e. it does not preserve joins; e.g. crdval({1, 2} ∪ {2, 3}) 6=
max(crdval({1, 2}), crdval({2, 3})). Thus, there exists no asso-
ciated concretisation f for which crdval is the lower adjoint in a
Galois connection. Yet, we can lift the abstraction operator crdval
to a Galois connection over P(P(Val)) through what is called a
supremus abstraction (?, p.52).
Lemma 3 Supremus abstraction. Let elt ∈ C → A be a function
from a set C, with codomain forming a complete lattice (A,v). Let
αelt(C) , tc∈C elt(c) and γelt(a) , {c ∈ C | elt(c) v a}. Then
(P(C),⊆) −−−−→←−−−−αelt
γelt
(A,v)
For example, define αcrdval(V) , maxV ∈V crdval(V ) and
γcrdval(n) , {V | crdval(V ) ≤ n}. Thus we obtain a Galois
connection (P(P(Val)),⊆) −−−−−−→←−−−−−−αcrdval
γcrdval
([0,∞] ,≤).
As another example let us consider, in simplified form, an
ingredient in dependency or noninterference analysis. For program
variable x, agreex ∈ P(States) → {tt,ff} determines whether a
set of states contains only states that all agree on x’s value:
agreex(Σ) , (∀σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, JxKσ = JxKσ′)
Function agreex is not additive, so it is not part of a Galois
connection from P(States) to {tt,ff}. The same problem arises
with agreements on multiple variables, and with more concrete
domains like the finite maximal trace semantics P(States∗).
We lift the operator agreex to a Galois connection over
P(P(States)). A supremus abstraction yields
αagreex(S) , (∀Σ ∈ S, agreex(Σ))
γagreex(bv) , {Σ | agreex(Σ)⇐= bv}
so that (P(P(States)),⊆) −−−−−−→←−−−−−−αagreex
γagreex
({tt,ff},⇐=).
These examples are consistent with the many formulations of
noninterference (e.g. (?????)) that motivated the characterisation of
information-flow security requirements as hyperproperties (?). Con-
cretising an abstract value a can be seen as defining the denotation of
a type expression (as in, for instance, ?, Sec. 3.3.1 and ?), i.e. defin-
ing the set of objects that satisfy the description a. Thus, concretising
tt, when tt is interpreted as “satisfies a property requirement”, nat-
urally yields a set of traces. Concretising tt, where tt is interpreted
as “satisfies a security requirement”, yields a set of sets of traces.
Intuitively, the most abstract denotation/concretisation of a
property requirement is defined in terms of a set of traces. The
most abstract concretisation/denotation of a security requirement
yields a set of sets of traces, namely a hyperproperty. Hints of this
intuition appear in the literature (????); e.g. security policies “are
predicates on sets of traces (i.e. they are higher order)” (?, p.2).
However, only recently has a comprehensive framework proposed a
sharp characterisation of security policies as hyperproperties (??).
Abstract interpretation of hyperproperties. The basic methodo-
logy for the verification of a hyperproperty HP, may be described
as follows:
Step 1. Design approximate representations forming a complete
lattice A, choose a collecting semantics C among the extended
hierarchy (set of sets domains, e.g. P(P(Trc))), and define α, γ
for a Galois connection (C,≤) −−→←−−α
γ
(A,v).
Step 2. Compute an approximation a ∈ A of the semanticsC ∈ C
of the program P of interest.
Step 3. Prove that the inferred approximation a implies that P
satisfies HP. The concretisation γ(a) is a set of trace sets,
of which the program’s trace set is a member—by contrast to
approximations of trace properties, which infer a single trace set
of which the program trace set is a subset. Then, it suffices to
prove γ(a) ⊆ HP.
Step 1 is guided by the need to have γ(a) ⊆ HP, i.e. a describes
a hyperproperty that implies HP. The calculational design (?) of
abstract domains greatly systematises Step 2, by relying on the
Galois connection defined in Step 1. Collecting semantics can be
adapted to the additional structure of sets, as we show in ??.
4. Hypercollecting Semantics
In the following, we introduce a hypercollecting semantics defined
over sets T ∈ P(P(Trc)) of sets of traces. This is used in
subsequent sections to derive static analyses.
Here is Step 2 of the methodology, spelled out in detail. Given
a Galois connection (P(P(Trc)),⊆) −−→←−−α
γ
(A,v]) built by the
supremus abstraction, and an approximation a of the initial traces
(i.e. IniTrc is in γ(a)), find an approximation a′ ∈ A of the
analysed program c, i.e. {|c|} IniTrc is in γ(a′). Then prove that the
program satisfies the hyperproperty HP of interest, i.e. γ(a′) ⊆ HP.
In order to compute a′, we define a hypercollecting semantics
LcM ∈ P(P(Trc)) → P(P(Trc)). That will serve to derive—in
the manner of ??—a static analysis that is correct by construction.
Hypercollecting semantics L c M ∈ P(P(Trc))→ P(P(Trc))
Lx := eMT , {{|x := e|}T | T ∈ T}
Lc1; c2MT , Lc2M ◦ Lc1MT LskipMT , T
Lif b then c1 else c2MT ,
{{|c1|} ◦ {| grdb |}T ∪ {|c2|} ◦ {| grd¬b |}T | T ∈ T}
Lwhile b do c MT , Lgrd¬bM
(
lfp⊆T Lif b then c else skipM
)
LgrdbMT , {{| grdb |}T | T ∈ T}
Recall from ?? that standard collecting semantics is a fixpoint-
based formulation that captures the direct image on sets of the
underlying program semantics – this is proved, for example, by ??.
The fixpoint formulation at the level of sets-of-sets we use is not
simply the direct image of the standard collecting semantics. The
direct image of the standard collecting semantics would yield a set
of (inner) fixpoints over sets of traces, whereas an outer fixpoint
over sets of sets of traces enables straightforward application of the
fixpoint transfer theorem.
Theorem 1 . For all c and all T ∈ P(Trc), {|c|}T is in L c M{T}.
For a singleton {T}, the set LcM{T} ∈ P(P(Trc)) is not
necessarily a singleton set containing only the element {|c|}T . If
c is a loop, LcM{T} yields a set of sets R of traces, where each set
R of traces contains only traces that exit the loop after less than
k iterations, for k ∈ N. We prove this theorem as corollary of the
following:
∀T ∈ P(P(Trc)), {{|c|}T | T ∈ T} ⊆ LcMT
This is proved by structural induction on commands. For loops, there
is a secondary induction on iterations of the loop body.
In summary, suppose one wishes to prove program c satisfies
hyperproperty HP ∈ P(P(Trc)), i.e. one wishes to prove that
{|c|}(IniTrc) ∈ HP. Suppose we have an approximation f ] of the
hypercollecting semantics, similarly to ??, i.e.
α ◦ LcM ◦ γ v̇] f ] (3)
Given ?? it suffices to find an abstract value a that approximates
IniTrc, i.e. IniTrc ∈ γ(a), and show that:
γ(f ](a)) ⊆ HP (4)
Why? ?? is equivalent to LcM ◦ γ ⊆̇ γ ◦ f ] by a property of Galois
connections. So we have {|c|}(IniTrc) ∈ LcM(γ(a)) ⊆ γ(f ](a)) ⊆
HP using IniTrc ∈ γ(a), the Theorem, and ??.
5. Information Flow
This section gives a number of technical definitions which build
up to the definition of Galois connections with which we specify
information flow policies explicitly as hyperproperties.
When a fixed main program is considered, we refer to it as P
and its variables as VarP. Our analyses are parametrised by the
program P to analyse, and an initial typing context Γ ∈ VarP → L
mapping each variable to a security level l ∈ L for its initial value.
We assume (L,v,t,u) is a finite lattice. In the most concrete case,
L may be defined as the universal flow lattice, i.e. the powerset of
variables P(VarP), from which all other information flow types can
be inferred through a suitable abstraction (?, Sec. 6.2); the initial
typing context is then defined as λx.{x}.
Initial l-equivalence and variety. A key notion in information
flow is l-equivalence. Two states are l-equivalent iff they agree on
the values of variables having security level at most l. We introduce
the same notion over a set of traces, requiring that the initial states
are l-equivalent. Let us first denote by JeKpre ∈ Trc → Val
the evaluation of expression e in the initial state σ of a trace
(σ, τ) ∈ Trc—unlike JeK ∈ Trc→ Val which evaluates expression
e in the final state τ . Then, we denote by T |=Γ l the judgement
that all traces in a set T ⊆ Trc are initially l-equivalent, i.e. they all
initially agree on the value of variables up to a security level l ∈ L.
For example, in the case thatL is the universal flow lattice, T |=Γ
{x, y} means ∀t1, t2 ∈ T, JxKpret1 = JxKpret2 ∧ JyKpret1 =
JyKpret2.
Initial l-equivalence T |=Γ l
T |=Γ l iff. ∀t1, t2 ∈ T,∀x ∈ VarP,
Γ(x) v l =⇒ JxKpret1 = JxKpret2
The notion of variety (?) underlies most definitions of quali-
tative and quantitative information flow security. Information is
transmitted from a to b over execution of program P if by “vary-
ing the initial value of a (exploring the variety in a), the resulting
value in b after P’s execution will also vary (showing that variety
is conveyed to b)” (?). We define the l-variety of expression e, as
the set of sets of values e may take, when considering only ini-
tially l-equivalent traces. The variety is defined first as a function
Ol{|e|} ∈ P(Trc) → P(P(Val)) on trace sets, from which we
obtain a function OlLeM ∈ P(P(Trc)) → P(P(Val)), on sets of
trace sets. Intuitively, l-variety of expression e is the variety that is
conveyed to e by varying only the input values of variables having a
security level l′ such that ¬(l′ v l).
l-variety Ol{|e|} OlLeM
Ol{|e|} ∈ P(Trc)→ P(P(Val))
Ol{|e|}T , {{|e|}R | R ⊆ T and R |=Γ l}
OlLeM ∈ P(P(Trc))→ P(P(Val))
OlLeMT , ∪T∈T Ol{|e|}T
Each set V ∈ Ol{|e|}T of values results from initially l-
equivalent traces (R |=Γ l for R ⊆ T ). Thus, expression e does not
leak sensitive information to attackers having a security clearance
l ∈ L ifOl{|e|}T is a set of singleton sets. Indeed, sensitive data for
attackers with security clearance l ∈ L is all data having a security
level l′ for which attackers do not have access (i.e. ¬(l′ v l) (?)).
Thus, if Ol{|e|}T is a set of singleton sets, this means that no matter
how sensitive information varies, this variety is not conveyed to
expression e.
Besides a pedagogical purpose, we define l-variety Ol{|e|} (resp.
OlLeM) instead of simply lifting the denotational semantics JeK of
expressions to sets of traces (resp. sets of sets of traces) since we
want to build modular abstractions of traces by relying on underlying
abstractions of values. Thus, l-variety enables us to pass information
about initially l-equivalent traces to the underlying domain of values
by keeping disjoint values that originate from traces that are not
initially l-equivalent.
Specifying information flow. We now have the ingredients needed
to describe information flow for command c, with respect to typing
context Γ ∈ VarP → L. A quantitative security metric, introduced
by ??, relies on min-entropy and min-capacity (?) in order to
estimate the leakage of a program. Let us assume a program P
that is characterized by a set TP ∈ P(Trc) of traces, i.e. TP ,
{| P |} IniTrc. For simplicity, assume attackers only observe the
value of a single variable x ∈ VarP. (The generalization to multiple
variables is straightforward.) The leakage of P, as measured by min-
capacity, to attackers having security clearance l ∈ L is defined
by
MLl , log2 ◦ αcrdval ◦ Ol{|x|}TP
(The definition of αcrdval follows ??.) For our purposes, it suffices
to know that this quantity aims to measure, in bits, the remaining
uncertainty about sensitive data for attackers with security clearance
l. Refer to the original work (?) for more details.
Leaving aside the logarithm in the definition ofMLl, a quan-
titative security requirement may enforce a limit on the amount of
information leaked to attackers with security clearance l ∈ L, by
requiring that the l-cardinality of variable x is less than or equal to
some non-negative integer k. We denote by SR(l, k, x) the hyper-
property that characterises this security requirement, i.e. the set of
program denotations satisfying it:
SR(l, k, x) , {T ∈ P(Trc) | αcrdval ◦ Ol{|x|}T ≤ k}
Note that SR implicitly depends on the choice of initial typing Γ, as
does Ol{|x|}T .
The termination-insensitive noninterference policy “the final
value of x depends only on the initial values of variables labelled
at most l” corresponds to the hyperproperty SR(l, 1, x). Therefore,
the program P satisfies SR(l, 1, x) if αcrdval ◦ Ol{|x|}TP ≤ 1.
Let T = LPM{IniTrc}. Since TP is in T (??), then P satisfies
SR(l, 1, x) if αcrdval ◦ OlLxMT ≤ 1, by monotony of αcrdval and
by Ol{|x|}TP ⊆ OlLxMT from the definition of OlL−M.
6. Dependences
We rely on abstract interpretation to derive a static analysis similar
to existing ones inferring dependences (????).
Recall that our analyses are parametrised on a security lattice
L and program P. We denote by l ; x an atomic dependence
constraint, with l ∈ L and x ∈ VarP, read as “agreement up to
security level l leads to agreement on x”. It is an atomic pre-post
contract expressing that the final value of x must only depend on
initial values having at most security level l. Said otherwise, l ; x
states the noninterference of variable x from data that is sensitive
for attackers with security clearance l, i.e. all inputs having security
level l′ such that ¬(l′ v l).
Dependences are similar to information flow types (?) and are
the dual of independences assertions (?). Both interpretations are
equivalent (?, Sec. 5).
Lattice of dependence constraints Dep D ∈ Dep
Given a lattice L and program P, define
Dep , P({l ; x | l ∈ L, x ∈ VarP})
D1 v\ D2 , D1 ⊇ D2 D1 t\ D2 , D1 ∩D2
In the rest of this section, L and P are fixed, together with a
typing context Γ ∈ VarP → L.
The semantic characterisation of dependences is tightly linked
to variety. An atomic constraint l ; x holds if no variety is
conveyed to x when the inputs up to security level l are fixed.
We use this intuition to define the Galois connections linking the
hypercollecting semantics and the lattice Dep, by instantiating the
supremus abstraction in ??.
The agreements abstraction approximates a set V ∈ P(P(Val))
by determining whether it contains variety.
Agreements abstraction agree αagree γagree
agree ∈ P(Val)→ {tt,ff}
agree(V ) , (∀v1, v2 ∈ V, v1 = v2)
αagree ∈ P(P(Val))→ {tt,ff}
αagree(V) , ∧V ∈V agree(V )
γagree ∈ {tt,ff} → P(P(Val))
γagree(bv) , {V ∈ P(Val) | agree(V )⇐= bv}
(P(P(Val)),⊆) −−−−−→←−−−−−αagree
γagree
({tt,ff},⇐=)
Note that γagree(tt) is {V ∈ P(Val) | agree(V )} and γagree(ff) is
P(Val). Also, agree(V ) iff |V | ≤ 1.
The dependences abstraction approximates a set T ∈ P(P(Trc))
by a dependence constraint D ∈ Dep. Recall that Ol{|x|}T is the
set of final values for variable x in traces t ∈ T that agree on inputs
of level at most l. So αagree(Ol{|x|}T ) holds just if there is at most
one final value.
Dependences abstraction deptr αdeptr γdeptr
deptr ∈ P(Trc)→ Dep
deptr(T ) , {l ; x | l ∈ L, x ∈ VarP, αagree(Ol{|x|}T )}
αdeptr ∈ P(P(Trc))→ Dep
αdeptr(T) , t\T∈T deptr(T )
γdeptr ∈ Dep→ P(P(Trc))
γdeptr(D) , {T | deptr(T )v\ D}
(P(P(Trc)),⊆) −−−−−−→←−−−−−−αdeptr
γdeptr
(Dep,v\)
Note that deptr(T ) is the set of dependences l ; x for which
αagree(Ol{|x|}T ) holds. For instance, the initial typing context
Γ ∈ VarP → L determines the initial dependences of a program:
αdeptr({IniTrc})
= {l ; x | l ∈ L, x ∈ VarP and αagree(Ol{|x|} IniTrc)}
= {l ; x | l ∈ L, x ∈ VarP and Γ(x) v l}
We derive an approximation1 OlDLeM\ of l-variety OlLeM. This
approximation OlDLeM\ ∈ Dep → {tt,ff}, called l-agreement of
expression e, determines whether a set D of dependence constraints
guarantees that no variety is conveyed to expression e when the
inputs up to security level l are fixed.
l-agreement of expressions OlDLeM\ ∈ Dep→ {tt,ff}
OlDLnM\D , tt OlDLxM\D , (l ; x ∈ D)
OlDLe1 ⊕ e2M\D , OlDLe1M\D ∧ OlDLe2M\D
OlDLe1 cmp e2M\D , OlDLe1M\D ∧ OlDLe2M\D
Deriving the clauses definingOlDL−M\ amounts to a constructive
proof of the following.
Lemma 4 . OlDLeM\ is sound:
∀e,∀l,∀D , αagree ◦ OlLeM ◦ γdeptr(D)⇐=OlDLeM\D .
Dependences abstract semantics. We derive a dependences ab-
stract semantics LcM\ by approximating the hypercollecting se-
mantics LcM. This abstract semantics LcM\ ∈ Dep → Dep over-
approximates the dependence constraints that hold after execution
of a command c, on inputs satisfying initial dependence constraints.
We assume a static analysis approximating the variables that a
command modifies.
Modifiable variables Mod ∈ Com→ P(V ar)
For all c, x, if there exists t, t′ ∈ Trc such that JcKt = t′ and
JxKpret′ 6= JxKt′, then x ∈ Mod(c).
1 We use symbol \ here, for contrast with similar notation using ] in later
sections
Dependences abstract semantics LcM\ ∈ Dep→ Dep
LskipM\D , D Lc1; c2M\D , Lc2M\ ◦ Lc1M\D
Lx := eM\D ,
{l ; y ∈ D | y 6= x} ∪ {l ; x | l ∈ L, OlDLeM\D}
Lif b then c1 else c2M\D ,
let D1 = Lc1M\D in
let D2 = Lc2M\D in
let W = Mod(if b then c1 else c2) in⋃
l∈L
{
πl(D1) t\ πl(D2) if OlDLbM\D
{l ; x ∈ πl(D) | x /∈W} otherwise
Lwhile b do cM\D , lfpv
]
D Lif b then c1 else c2M
\
πl(D) , {l ; x ∈ D | x ∈ VarP}
The abstract semantics of assignments x := e discards all atomic
constraints related to variable x in the input set D of constraints,
and adds atomic constraints l ; x if D guarantees l-agreement
for expression e. For conditionals, for each security level l, if
the input set D guarantees l-agreement of the conditional guard,
the abstract semantics computes the join over the dependences of
both conditional branches, after projecting to only those atomic
constraints related to l (notation πl(−)). If D does not guarantee
l-agreement of the conditional guard, atomic constraints related to
both l and variables possibly modified are discarded. Intuitively, if D
guarantees l-agreement of the conditional guard, then l-agreement
over some variable x in both branches guarantees l-agreement over
x after the conditional command. Otherwise, the only l-agreements
that are guaranteed after the conditional are those that hold before
the conditional for variables that are not modified.
Theorem 2 . The dependences semantics is sound:
αdeptr ◦ LcM ◦ γdeptr v̇\ LcM\ .
We denote by v̇\ the point-wise lifting of the partial order v\.
We can derive this abstract semantics by directly approximating the
relational hypercollecting semantics LcM through the dependences
Galois connection (αdeptr, γdeptr). The derivation is by structural
induction on commands. It leverages mathematical properties of
Galois connections. We start with the specification of the best
abstract transformer αdeptr ◦ LcM ◦ γdeptr ∈ Dep → Dep, and
successively approximate it to finally obtain the definition of the
dependence abstract semantics for each form of command. The
derivation is the proof, and the obtained definition of the abstract
semantics is correct by construction.
Let us showcase the simplest derivation for a sequence of
commands in order to illustrate this process:
αdeptr ◦ Lc1; c2M ◦ γdeptr
= HBy definition of the hypercollecting semanticsI
αdeptr ◦ Lc2M ◦ Lc1M ◦ γdeptr
v̇\ HBy γdeptr ◦ αdeptr is extensive I
αdeptr ◦ Lc2M ◦ γdeptr ◦ αdeptr ◦ Lc1M ◦ γdeptr
v̇\ HBy induction hypothesis αdeptr ◦ LcM ◦ γdeptr v̇\ LcM\I
Lc2M\ ◦ Lc1M\
, HTake this last approximation as the definition.I
Lc1; c2M\
Alternatively, we can leverage Galois connections to give the
analysis as an approximation of the cardinality analysis. We work
this out by ????, introduced in ??.
Comparison with previous analyses. Our dependence analysis is
similar to the logic of ? as well as the flow-sensitive type system
of ?. The relationship between our sets D ∈ Dep of dependence
constraints and the type environments ∆ ∈ VarP → L of Hunt and
Sands can be formalised by the abstraction:
αhs ∈ Dep→ VarP → L
αhs(D) , λx. u {l | l ; x ∈ D}
γhs ∈ (VarP → L)→ Dep
γhs(∆) , {l ; x | x ∈ VarP, l ∈ L, ∆(x) v l}
This is in fact an isomorphism because of the way we interpret
dependences. Indeed, if l ; x holds, then also l′ ; x for all
l′ ∈ L such that l v l′ (cf. report (?)). This observation suggests
reformulating the sets D ∈ Dep of dependence constraints to
contain only elements with minimal level, but we refrain from doing
so for simplicity of presentation.
Our dependences analysis is at least as precise as the type system
of Hunt and Sands. To state this result, we denote by⊥L the bottom
element of the lattice L. We also assume that the modified variables
is precise enough to simulate the same effect as the program counter
used in the type system: Mod(c) is a subset of the variables that are
targets of assignments in c.
Theorem 3 . For all c, D0,D ∈ Dep, ∆0,∆ ∈ VarP → L, where
⊥L ` ∆0{c}∆, and D = LcM\D0, it holds that:
αhs(D0) v̇∆0 =⇒ αhs(D) v̇∆ .
7. Cardinality Abstraction
Dependence analysis is only concerned with whether variety is con-
veyed. We refine this analysis by deriving a cardinality abstraction
that enumerates variety.
We denote by l ; x#n an atomic cardinality constraint where
l ∈ L, x ∈ VarP and n ∈ [0,∞], read as “agreement up to security
level l leads to a variety of at most n values in variable x”.
Lattice of cardinality constraints Card C ∈ Card
For a program P and lattice L, we say C is a valid set of constraints
iff ∀x ∈ VarP, ∀l ∈ L, ∃!n ∈ [0,∞] , l ; x#n ∈ C .
Let Card be the set of valid sets of constraints.
It is a complete lattice:
C1 v] C2 iff ∀l ; x#n1 ∈ C1, ∃n2,
l ; x#n2 ∈ C2 ∧ n1 ≤ n2
C1 t] C2 , {l ; x# max(n1, n2) |
l ; x#n1 ∈ C1, l ; x#n2 ∈ C2}
In the rest of this section, L and P are fixed, together with a
typing context Γ ∈ VarP → L.
A valid constraint set is essentially a function from l and x to n.
So v] is essentially a pointwise order on functions, and we ensure
that v] is antisymmetric.
The cardinality abstraction relies on the abstraction αcrdval,
introduced in ??, in order to approximate l-variety of a variable
into a cardinality n ∈ [0,∞].
Cardinality abstraction crdtr αcrdtr γcrdtr
crdtr ∈ P(Trc)→ Card
crdtr(T ) , {l ; x#n | l ∈ L, x ∈ VarP,
n = αcrdval(Ol{|x|}T ) }
αcrdtr ∈ P(P(Trc))→ Card
αcrdtr(T) , t]T∈T crdtr(T )
γcrdtr ∈ Card→ P(P(Trc))
γcrdtr(C ) , {T | crdtr(T )v] C }
(P(P(Trc)),⊆) −−−−−→←−−−−−αcrdtr
γcrdtr
(Card,v])
The cardinality abstraction enables us to derive an approximation
OlCLeM] of l-varietyOlLeM. This approximationOlCLeM] ∈ Card→
[0,∞], called l-cardinality of expression e, enumerates the l-variety
conveyed to expression e assuming a set C ∈ Card of cardinality
constraints holds. Note that the infinite cardinal∞ is absorbing, i.e.
∀n,∞× n ,∞.
l-cardinality of expressions OlCLeM] ∈ Card→ [0,∞]
OlCLnM]C , 1 OlCLxM]C , n where l ; x#n ∈ C
OlCLe1 ⊕ e2M]C , OlCLe1M]C ×OlCLe2M]C
OlCLe1 cmp e2M]C , min
(
2,OlCLe1M]C ×OlCLe2M]C
)
Lemma 5 . OlCLeM] is sound:
∀e,∀l, αcrdval ◦ OlLeM ◦ γcrdtr ≤̇ OlCLeM] .
We now derive a cardinality abstract semantics by approximating
the relational hypercollecting semantics of ??. It uses definitions to
follow.
Cardinality abstract semantics LcM] ∈ Card→ Card
LskipM]C , C Lc1; c2M]C , Lc2M] ◦ Lc1M]C
Lx := eM]C ,
{l ; y#n ∈ C | y 6= x}
∪{l ; x#n | l ∈ L, x ∈ VarP, n = OlCLeM]C }
Lif b then c1 else c2M]C ,
let C1 = Lc1M]C in
let C2 = Lc2M]C in
let W = Mod(if b then c1 else c2) in⋃
l∈L
{
πl(C1) t] πl(C2) if OlCLbM]C = 1
πl(C1) t]add(W,πl(C)) πl(C2) otherwise
Lwhile b do cM]C , lfpv
]
C Lif b then c1 else c2M
]
πl(C ) , {l ; x#n ∈ C | x ∈ VarP, n ∈ [0,∞]}
C1 t]add(W,C0) C2 ,
⋃
x∈VarP \W {l ; x#n ∈ C0}
∪⋃x∈W {l ; x#(n1+n2) |
l ; x#nj ∈ Cj , j = 1, 2}
The abstract semantics of assignments x := e is similar in spirit
to the one for dependences: discard atomic constraints related to x,
and add new ones by computing l-cardinality of expression e. The
abstract semantics of conditionals is also similar to dependences:
if the conditional guard does not convey l-variety, then all initially
l-equivalent traces follow the same execution path and the join
operator (defined as max over cardinality) over both conditional
branches over-approximates the l-cardinality after the conditional.
Otherwise, the l-cardinality over both conditional branches have
to be summed—for the variables that may be modified in the
conditional branches—to soundly approximate the l-cardinality after
the conditional.
Theorem 4 . The cardinality abstract semantics is sound:
αcrdtr ◦ LcM ◦ γcrdtr v̇] LcM] .
The lattice Card is complete, although not finite. We may
define a widening operator∇ ∈ Card×Card→ Card to ensure
convergence of the analysis (?)(?)(?, Sec. 4).
C1∇C2 , {l ; x#n | l ; x#n1 ∈ C1, l ; x#n2 ∈ C2,
n = n1∇n2}
n1∇n2 , if (n2 ≤ n1) then n1 else∞
The occurrence of widening depends on the iteration strategy
employed by the static analyser. Widening accelerates or forces
the convergence of fixpoint computations. In the simplest setting,
the analyser passes as arguments to the widening operator the old
set C1 of cardinality as well as the new set C2 that is computed.
For each atomic cardinality constraint, the widening operator then
compares the old cardinality n1 to the new cardinality n2. If the
cardinality is still strictly increasing (n2 > n1), the widening forces
the convergence by setting it to∞. If the cardinality is decreasing,
the widening operator sets it to the maximum cardinality n1 in
order to force convergence and ensure the sequence of computed
cardinalities is stationary.
Min-capacity leakage. So far, we showed how one can derive
static analyses of hyperproperties—the abstract representations
themselves are interpreted as hyperproperties—by approximating
hypercollecting semantics. Let us now recall the security require-
ment SR(l, k, x) introduced in ?? in order to illustrate how these
analyses may prove that a program satisfies a hyperproperty, i.e.
Step 3 of the methodology in ?? (see also ??).
Consider a program P characterised by a set TP ∈ P(Trc) of
traces, i.e. TP is {| P |} IniTrc. How do we prove that P satisfies the
hyperproperty SR(l, k, x)? We can use the cardinality analysis to
prove that variable x has a l-cardinality that is at most k. Indeed,
if C approximates TP (i.e. αcrdtr({TP}) v] C ) then αcrdval ◦
Ol{|x|}TP ≤ OlCLxM]C . Thus, if the inferred l-cardinality of C is
at most k then program P is guaranteed to satisfy the hyperproperty
SR(l, k, x). We have {TP} ⊆ γcrdtr(C ) since C approximates TP
(i.e. αcrdtr({TP}) v] C ). And we have γcrdtr(C ) ⊆ SR(l, k, x)
by assumption OlCLxM]C ≤ k. Hence TP ∈ SR(l, k, x).
The hyperproperty SR(l, k, x) is a (k + 1)-safety hyperpro-
perty (?), i.e. it requires exhibiting at most k + 1 traces in order
to prove that a program does not satisfy SR(l, k, x). For example,
termination-insensitive noninterference for security level l, which
corresponds to the hyperproperty SR(l, 1, x), is 2-safety. A k-safety
hyperproperty of a program can be reduced to a safety property of a
k-fold product program (????).
Various quantitative information flow properties are not k-safety.
For example, the bounding problem that the cardinality analysis
targets, namely min-capacity leakage is not a k-safety hyperpro-
perty for any k (?, Sec. 3). Instead, this bounding problem is hyper-
safety (?).
Cardinality vs. dependence. Just as quantitative security metrics
are the natural generalisations of qualitative metrics such as nonin-
terference, the cardinality abstraction is a natural generalisation of
dependence analysis. Instead of deciding if variety is conveyed, the
cardinality analysis enumerates this variety. In other words, depen-
dences are abstractions of cardinalities. We can factor the Galois con-
nections, e.g. (αagree, γagree) is (αlqone ◦ αcrdval, γcrdval ◦ γlqone)
for suitable (αlqone, γlqone).
Lemma 6 . (αagree, γagree) is the composition of two Galois con-
nections (αcrdval, γcrdval) and (αlqone, γlqone) :
(P(P(Val)),⊆) −−−−−−→←−−−−−−αcrdval
γcrdval
([0,∞] ,≤) −−−−−→←−−−−−αlqone
γlqone
({tt,ff},⇐=)
with:
αlqone(n) ,
{
tt if n ≤ 1
ff otherwise.
, and
γlqone(bv) ,
{
1 if bv = tt
∞ otherwise.
Lemma 7 . (αdeptr, γdeptr) is the composition of two Galois con-
nections (αcrdtr, γcrdtr) and (αlqonecc, γlqonecc) :
(P(P(Trc)),⊆) −−−−−→←−−−−−αcrdtr
γcrdtr
(Card,v]) −−−−−−−→←−−−−−−−αlqonecc
γlqonecc
(Dep,v\)
with:
αlqonecc(C ) , {l ; x | l ; x#n ∈ C and αlqone(n)}
γlqonecc(D) ,
⋃
l∈L,x∈VarP
{l ; x#n | n = γlqone(l ; x ∈ D)}
We use ???? to abstract further the cardinality abstract semantics
and derive the correct by construction dependence analysis of ??.
This derivation, which can be found in (?), proves ?? and ?? stated
earlier.
As a corollary and by ??, this also proves the precision of the
cardinality analysis relative to Amtoft and Banerjee’s logic (?) as
well as Hunt and Sands’ type system (??).
Corollary 1 No leakage for well-typed programs. For all c,
C0,C ∈ Card, ∆0,∆ ∈ VarP → L, where ⊥L ` ∆0{c}∆,
and C = LcM]C0, it holds that:
αhs ◦ αlqonecc(C0) v̇∆0 =⇒(
∀x ∈ VarP, l ∈ L, ∆(x) v l =⇒ OlCLxM] ≤ 1
)
The cardinality analysis determines that there is no leakage for
programs that are “well-typed” by the flow-sensitive type system
of Hunt and Sands. By “well-typed”, we mean that the final typing
environment that is computed by the type system allows attackers
with security clearance l ∈ L to observe a variable x ∈ VarP.
To the best of our knowledge, the cardinality abstraction is
the first approximation-based analysis for quantitative information
flow that provides a formal precision guarantee wrt. traditional
analyses for qualitative information flow. This advantage makes
the cardinality analysis appealing even when interested in proving
a qualitative security policy such as non-interference, since the
cardinality abstraction provides quantitative information that may
assist in making better informed decisions if declassification is
necessary. Nonetheless, we need further experimentation to compare
to other quantitative analyses —see ??.
8. Towards More Precision
This section introduces examples to evaluate the precision of the
analyses, and shows how existing analyses can be leveraged to
improve precision. For simplicity, we consider a two point lattice
{L,H} and an initial typing context where variables yi are the
only low variables (Γ(yi) = L). As is usual, low may flow to high
(L v H).
Consider the following program.
1 if (y1 ≥ secret) then
2 x := y2
3 else
4 x := y3
Listing 1. Leaking 1 bit of secret
The cardinal abstraction determines that x has at most 2 values
after the execution of the program in ??, for initially L-equivalent
traces. For fixed low inputs, x has one value in the then branch and
one value in the else branch, and these cardinalities get summed
after the conditional since the conditional guard may evaluate to
2 different values. Thus, the cardinality abstraction proves that this
example program satisfies the hyperproperty SR(L, 2, x).
Stronger trace properties. Another way of proving a hyperpro-
perty is by proving a stronger trace property. If a program is proven
to satisfy a trace property T ∈ P(Trc), then proving that T is
stronger than hyperproperty H ∈ P(P(Trc))—in the sense that
γhpp(T ) ⊆ H—guarantees the program satisfies the hyperpro-
perty H . For instance, by proving for some program that an output
variable x ranges over an interval of integer values whose size is k,
we can prove that program satisfies SR(L, k, x).
However, approximating a hyperproperty by a trace property
may be too coarse for some programs, as we can illustrate with
an interval analysis (?) on the example program in ??. Such an
interval analysis loses too much precision in the initial state of
this program, since it maps all low input variables y1, y2 and y3 to
[−∞,+∞]. After the conditional, it determines that x belongs to the
interval [−∞,+∞], which is a coarse over-approximation. Also,
a polyhedron (?) does not capture the disjunction that is needed
for this example program (x = y2 or x = y3). Both abstract
domains and many more existing ones are not suitable for the task
of inferring cardinalities or dependences because they are convex.
Using them as a basis to extract counting information delivers an
over-approximation of the leakage, but a very coarse one, especially
in the presence of low inputs.
A disjunction of two polyhedra (through powerset domains,
disjunctive postconditions, or trace partitioning) is as precise as
the cardinality analysis for this example. However, disjunctions are
not tractable in general. As soon as one fixes a maximum number of
disjunctive elements (as in the quantitative information flow analysis
of ??) or defines a widening operator to guarantee convergence, one
loses the relative precision wrt. classical dependence analyses (??)
that the cardinality analysis guarantees (Cf. ??).
Consider the following program.
1 if (y1 ≥ secret) then x := y2 else x := y3;
2 o := y4 * x
Listing 2. Leaking x
The cardinal abstraction determines that variable o leaks the two
possible values of x; for fixed low inputs, x has two possible values
whereas y4 has one possible value. Relational abstract domains
such as polyhedra (?) or octogons (?) do not support non-linear
expressions, and therefore are unable to compute a precise bound
of the leakage for variable o. An analysis with a disjunction {x =
y2 ∨ x = y3} of polyhedra and with linearisation over intervals (?)
will compute either {o = y2 ∗ [−∞,+∞] ∨ y3 ∗ [−∞,+∞]}
if the linearisation happens for the right expression, or {o =
[−∞,+∞] ∗ x, y3 ∗ [−∞,+∞] ∗ x} if the linearisation happens
for the left expression; none will deduce that variable o has at most
2 values.
Scaling to richer languages. We can rely on existing abstract
domains to support richer language constructs, e.g. pointers and
aliasing. Consider the following variation of ??.
if (y1 ≥ secret) then
p := &y2
else
p := &y3
o := *p
Listing 3. Leaking 1 bit of secret
The cardinality abstraction determines that initially L-equivalent
memories lead to a variety of at most 2 in the pointer p after the
conditional, whereas both y2 and y3 have a variety of 1. Assuming
an aliasing analysis determines that p may point to y2 or y3, the
cardinality analysis determines that variable o has a variety of at
most 2, for initially L-equivalent memories.
Improving precision. To improve precision of the cardinality ab-
straction, we can augment it with existing abstract domains. One
shortcoming of the cardinality analysis is the fact that it is not rela-
tional. Assuming attackers with security clearance L observe both
variable x and o after the execution of ??, the cardinality abstraction
leads us to compute a leakage of two bits: four different possible
values, instead of only 2 possible values for initially L-equivalent
memories. Relying on a relational domain with linearisation (?) over
cardinality (instead of intervals) captures the required constraints
{L ; o#1 ∗ x, L ; x#2} to compute a leakage of only one
bit; these constraints are to be interpreted as “initially L-equivalent
memories result in x having at most 2 values, and o being equal to
one fixed integer times x”.
We leave these extensions of the cardinality abstraction for future
work. In the following, we focus on one particular improvement
to both previous analyses in order to gain more precision. We
uncovered this case while deriving the analysis by relying on the
calculational framework of abstract interpretation. Indeed, notice
that the following holds:
αcrdval ◦ OlLx1M ◦ Lgrdx1==x2M ◦ γcrdtr(C ) ≤ OlCLx2M]C
αcrdval ◦ OlLx2M ◦ Lgrdx1==x2M ◦ γcrdtr(C ) ≤ OlCLx1M]C
Therefore, we can deduce that:
αcrdtr ◦ Lgrdx1==x2M ◦ γcrdtr(C )
v] {l ; x#n ∈ C | x 6= x1, x 6= x2}
∪ {l ; x1# min(n1, n2), l ; x2# min(n1, n2) |
l ; x1#n1 ∈ C , l ; x2#n2 ∈ C }
, Lgrdx1==x2M]C
For other comparison operators, we use as before LgrdbM]C , C .
We can now also improve the dependences abstraction:
αlqonecc ◦ Lgrdx1==x2M] ◦ γlqonecc(D)
v\ αlqonecc ({l ; x#n ∈ γlqonecc(D) | x 6= x1, x 6= x2})
∪ αlqonecc({l ; x1# min(n1, n2), l ; x2# min(n1, n2) |
l ; x1#n1 ∈ γlqonecc(D), l ; x2#n2 ∈ γlqonecc(D)})
v\ {l ; x ∈ D | x 6= x1, x 6= x2}
∪ {l ; x1, l ; x2 | l ; x1 ∈ D or l ; x2 ∈ D}
, Lgrdx1==x2M\D
For other comparison operators, we also use LgrdbM\D , D .
With these new definitions, we can update the abstract semantics
of conditionals and loops, for both dependences and cardinalites, to
leverage the transfer functions Lgrd−M\ and Lgrd−M].
Improved dependences abstract semantics LcM\ ∈ Dep→ Dep
Lif b then c1 else c2M\D ,
let D1 = LgrdbM\ ◦ Lc1M\D in
let D2 = Lgrd¬bM\ ◦ Lc2M\D in
let W = Mod(if b then c1 else c2) in⋃
l∈L
{
πl(D1) t\ πl(D2) if OlDLbM\D
{l ; x ∈ πl(D) | x /∈W} otherwise
Lwhile b do cM\D , Lgrd¬bM\ ◦ lfpv
]
D Lif b then c1 else c2M
\
Improved cardinality abs. semantics LcM] ∈ Card→ Card
Lif b then c1 else c2M]C ,
let C1 = LgrdbM] ◦ Lc1M]C in
let C2 = Lgrd¬bM] ◦ Lc2M]C in
let W = Mod(if b then c1 else c2) in⋃
l∈L
{
πl(C1) t] πl(C2) if OlCLbM]C = 1
πl(C1) t]add(W,πl(C)) πl(C2) otherwise
Lwhile b do cM]C , Lgrd¬bM\ ◦ lfpv
]
C Lif b then c1 else c2M
]
To illustrate the benefits of this improvement, consider the
following example.
1 while (secret != y3) do {
2 x := x+1;
3 secret := secret - 1;
4 }
5 o := secret;
Listing 4. Improved precision
The cardinality analysis determines that initially L-equivalent
memories result in x having an infinity of values: the L-cardinality
of x grows until it is widened to∞. In contrast, the cardinalities
also determines that variables o and secret have only 1 value,
assuming L-equivalent memories. This is because of the reduction
that concerns variable secret after the while loop, specifically
Lgrdsecret==y3M\. Similarly, the improved dependences analysis
also determines that both variables secret and o are low.
Remarkably, this has been overlooked by many previous analyses.
In fact, this simple improvement makes our dependence analysis
strictly more precise than ?’s and ??’s analyses and incomparable to
the more recent dependence analysis of ?.
Combination with intervals. Consider now the following example
inspired from ?.
1 if (secret == 0) then {
2 x := 0;
3 y := y + 1;
4 }
5 else {
6 x := 0;
7 }
Listing 5. Example program from ?
The analysis of ? determines that x is low, whereas the cardinality
abstraction determines that L-equivalent memories result in at most
2 values for variable x, because it does not track the actual values of
the variables. We can combine cardinality with an interval analysis
to be more precise in such cases, through a reduced product (???).
Assume a set StInt of interval environments provided with
the usual partial order that we denote by ≤̇],Int. Assume also
a Galois connection (αInt, γInt) enabling the derivation of an
interval analysis as an approximation of a standard collecting
semantics defined over P(Trc). We can lift this Galois connection
to P(P(Trc)) to obtain a Galois connection by compositing with
(αhpp, γhpp), to obtain (α′, γ′) , (αInt ◦ αhpp, γInt ◦ γhpp) with:
(P(P(Trc)),⊆) −−−−−→←−−−−−αhpp
γhpp
(P(Trc),⊆) −−−−→←−−−−
αInt
γInt
(StInt, ≤̇],Int)
A Granger’s reduced product ? for the cardinality abstraction and
an interval analysis may be defined as a pair of functions toint ∈
Card× StInt → StInt and tocard ∈ Card×StInt → Card
verifying the following conditions:
1. soundness:
γ′(toint(C , ı)) ∩ γcrdtr(C ) = γ′(ı) ∩ γcrdtr(C )
γ′(ı) ∩ γcrdtr(tocard(C , ı)) = γ′(ı) ∩ γcrdtr(C )
2. reduction:
toint(C , ı) ≤̇],Int ı
tocard(C , ı)v] C
Let us denote by size the function that returns the size of an
interval. One such Granger’s reduced product can be defined as:
tocard ∈ Card×StInt→ Card
tocard(C , ı) , {l ; x#n′ | l ; x#n ∈ C and
n′ = min (n, size ı(x))}
toint ∈ Card×StInt→ Card
toint(C , ı) , ı
Once enhanced with this reduced product, the cardinality analy-
sis determines for the program in ??, that L-equivalent memories
result in at most one possible value for variable x.
The dependences analysis can be improved similarly, with a
reduction function defined as follows:
todep ∈ Dep×StInt→ Dep
todep(D , ı) , D ∪ {l ; x | l ∈ L and size ı(x) = 1}
Once extended with a reduced product with intervals, the depen-
dence analysis is also able to determine that variable x is low for
the program in ??.
More reduced products. As a final example, let us consider ??,
inspired by ?, program 7, that we annotate with the result of the
improved cardinality abstraction. To the best of our knowledge, no
0 //L; h#∞, L; y1#1, L; y2#1, L; y3#1
1 y1 := 1;//L; y1#1
2 if (h == y1) then {
3 skip; //L; h#1, L; y1#1, L; y2#1
4 }
5 else {
6 y2 := 5; //L; y1#1, L; y2#1
7 while (y2 != 1) do {
8 y2 := y2-1;//L; y2#1
9 y1 := y2;//L; y1#1
10 }//L; y1#1, L; y2#1
11 }
12 //L; h#∞, L; y1#2, L; y2#2, L; y3#1
13 o := y1 * y3;//L; o#2
Listing 6. No leakage for variable o
existing automated static analysis determines that variable o is low at
the end of this program. Also, no prior monitor but the one recently
presented by ? accepts all executions of this program, assuming
attackers with clearance L can observe variable o.
For initially L-equivalent memories, the cardinality abstraction
determines that variables y1, y2 and o have at most two values. This
result is precise for y2, but not precise for y1 and o. As a challenge,
let us see what is required to gain more precision to determine that
both variables y1 and o have at most 1 possible value – in other
words, they are low.
To tackle this challenge, we need to consider cardinality com-
bined with an interval analysis and a simple relational domain track-
ing equalities. With the equality y1 = y2 at the exit of the loop, both
y1 and y2 will be reduced to the singleton interval [1, 1]. After the
conditional, we still deduce that y2 has at most 2 different values
thanks to the cardinality abstraction. Using intervals, we deduce that
variable y1 has only one value (singleton interval [1, 1]). And finally,
at the last assignment the cardinalities abstraction determines that
variable o has only one possible value. Similarly, this same combi-
nation of analyses can be put to use to let the dependence analysis
reach the desired precision.
9. Related Work
Although noninterference has important applications, for many secu-
rity requirements it is too strong. That is one motivation for research
in quantitative information flow analysis. In addition, a number of
works investigate weakenings of noninterference and downgrad-
ing policies that are conditioned on events or data values (???). ?
introduce abstract noninterference, which generalizes noninterfer-
ence by means of abstract interpretations that specify, for example,
limits on the attacker’s power and the extent of partial releases (de-
classification). The survey by ? further generalizes the notion and
highlights, among other things, its applicability to a range of under-
lying semantics. The Galois connections in this work are at the level
of trace sets, not sets of sets. Abstract noninterference retains the
explicit 2-run formulation (??): from two related initial states, two
executions lead to related final states. The relations are defined in
terms of abstract interpretations of the individual states/executions. ?
show how to infer indistinguishability relations—modelling attack-
ers’ observations—to find the best abstract noninterference policy
that holds. The inference algorithm iteratively refines the relation by
using counter-examples and abstract domain completion (?).
Set-of-sets structures occur in work on abstraction for nonde-
terministic programs, but in those works one level of sets are pow-
erdomains for nondeterminacy; the properties considered are trace
properties (??). ? develop a binding time analysis and a strictness
analysis (?) based on partial equivalence relations: Their concretisa-
tions are sets of equivalence classes. ? point out that this analysis
could be achieved by a collecting semantics over sets-of-sets, de-
fined simply as a direct image. To the best of our knowledge this
has not been explored further in the literature, except in unpublished
work on which this paper builds (??).
?? extend temporal logic with means to quantify over multiple
traces in order to express hyperproperties, and provide model
checking algorithms for finite space systems. ? introduce a technique
for runtime verification of k-safety properties.
The dependences analysis we derive is similar to the information
flow logic of ? and the equivalent flow-sensitive type system of ?.
Amtoft and Banerjee use the domain P(Trc) and on the basis of
a relational logic they validate a forward analysis. In effect their
interpretation of “independences” is a Galois connection with sets
of sets, but the analysis is not formulated or proved correct as an
abstract interpretation. To deal with dynamically allocated state, ?
augment the relational assertions of information flow logic with
region assertions, which can be computed by abstract interpretation.
This is used both to express agreement relations between the
two executions and to approximate modifiable locations. This
approach is generalized in ? to a relational Hoare logic for object-
based programs that encompasses information flow properties with
conditional downgrading (?).
? give a backwards analysis that infers dependencies and is
proved strictly more precise than (??). This is achieved by product
construction that facilitates inferring relations between variables in
executions that follow different control paths. Correctness of the
analysis is proved by way of a relational Hoare logic. The variations
of our proposed analyses, in ??, rivals theirs in terms of precision—
they are incomparable.
Our dependence analysis relies on an approximation of the mod-
ifiable variables, to soundly track implicit flows due to control flow,
instead of labelling a program counter variable pc to account for
implicit flows (?). ? also derive a similar analysis through a syntactic
Galois connection—a syntactic assignment z := x ∗ y is abstracted
into a propositional formula x → z ∧ y → z denoting an infor-
mation flow from variables x and y to variable z. The soundness
of this analysis wrt. a semantic property such as noninterference
requires more justification, though it is remarkable that the concreti-
sation of propositional formula yields, roughly speaking, a set of
program texts. ? also provides an abstract interpretation account
of a flow-insensitive type system (?) enforcing noninterference
by guaranteeing a stronger safety property, namely that sensitive
locations should not influence public locations ?.
? explicitly formulate termination-insensitive noninterference as
an abstract interpretation, namely the “merge over all twin computa-
tions” that makes explicit both the 2-safety aspect and the need for
an analysis to relate some aligned intermediate states. Their analysis,
like many others, is based on reducing the problem to a safety pro-
perty of product programs. ? implement an algorithm that automates
reasoning in a Hoare logic for k-safety, implicitly constructing prod-
uct programs; the performance compares favorably with explicit
construction of product programs. Program dependency graphs are
another approach to dependency, is shown to be correct for nonin-
terference by ?, by way of slicing and a simulation argument.
?, Chap. 5 proposes the first quantitative measure of a program’s
leakage in terms of Shannon entropy (?). Other quantitative metrics
emerge in the literature (??????). These quantitative security met-
rics model different scenarios suitable for different policies. Most
existing static analyses for quantitative information flow leverage
existing model checking tools and abstract domains for safety; they
prove that a program satisfies a quantitative security requirement by
proving a stronger safety property. In contrast, the cardinal abstrac-
tion proves a hyperproperty by inferring a stronger hyperproperty
satisfied by the analysed program. This is key to target quantitative
information flow in mutlilevel security lattices, beyond the 2-point
lattice {L,H}.
? synthesize equivalence classes induced by outputs over low
equivalent memories by relying on software model checkers, in
order to bound various quantitative metrics. ? also rely on a similar
technique to quantify information flow for database queries. ? note
that the exact computation of information-theoretic characteristics
is prohibitively hard, and propose to rely on approximation-based
analyses, among which are randomisation techniques and abstract
interpretation ones. They also propose to rely on a self-composed
product program to model a scenario where attackers may refine
their knowledge by influencing the low inputs. ? relies on similar
techniques to handle programs with low inputs, and uses polyhedra
to synthesize linear constraints (?) over variables. ? decide whether
answering a query on sensitive data augments attackers’ knowledge
beyond a certain threshold, by using probabilistic polyhedra.
10. Conclusion
Galois connection-based semantic characterisations of program
analyses provide new perspectives and insights that lead to improved
techniques. We have extended the framework to fully encompass
hyperproperties, through a remarkable form of hypercollecting
semantics that enables calculational derivation of analyses. This
new foundation raises questions too numerous to list here.
One promising direction is to combine dependency and cardinal-
ity analysis with existing abstract domains, e.g. through advanced
symbolic methods (?), and partitioning (??).
Static analysis of secure information flow has yet to catch up with
recent advances in dynamic information flow monitoring (?????).
We discussed, in ??, how existing static analyses may be of use to
statically secure information flow. It seems likely that hypercollect-
ing semantics will also be of use for dynamic analyses.
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